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 Does social identity matter in individual alienation?
Household-level evidence in post-reform India
Abstract
Does consumption distance as a measure of individual alienation reveal the effect of social
identity? Using the central idea of Akerlof’s social distance theory, individual distance is
calculated from their own group mean (median) consumption and then we examine whether
individuals from different social groups - caste and religion - are alienated across the distance
distribution. Using India’s household-level microdata on consumption expenditure covering
three major survey rounds since the inception of the reform period, we find a non-unique
pattern in the distance distribution where the marginalised and minority group households
tend to be alienated across the distribution. However, among them, the households with
higher educational attainment become more integrated as reflected in the interaction effect
of education. These results are robust even after controlling for the endogeneity of edu-
cation. Given this significant group difference in consumption, we undertake a group-level
comparison by creating a counterfactual group through exchanging the characteristics of the
priviledged group to the marginalised group (or Hindus to non-Hindus), and find that the
privileged group still consumes more than the counterfactual marginalised group, explaining
around 77% of the estimated average consumption gap at the median quantile in 2011-12 (or
59% for Hindus versus Non-Hindus). This suggests other inherent identity-specific social fac-
tors as possible contributors to within-group alienation (relative to a better-off category) that
can only be minimised through promoting education for marginalised (or minority religion)
groups.
Key Words: Consumption distance; Social identity; Social distance;
Counter-factual distribution; India.
JEL Classifications: O1; R2; I3; D1
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“Our inequality materializes our upper class, vulgarizes our middle class, brutalizes
our lower class”.
- Matthew Arnold (English Essayist (1822-1838))
“This civilization is the impact of the world’s consumption behavior”. Toba Beta,
Betelgeuse Incident: Insiden Bait Al-Jauza
- Carol Graham, The Economist, Feb 1st, 2010
1 Introduction
Whether income growth alone is sufficient to improve economic well-being in the long run remains
a disputed issue1, especially in developing countries like India where the economy has experienced
a high growth rate of 8-9% in the last decade compared to 5% in the 1990s (Dev, 2013). At the
same time, the official statistics and academic research have shown that the increasing trend in
income growth has contributed to higher economic inequality both at the aggregate level and
among different social identities (Motiram and Sharma, 2011; the Government of India, 2013).
Research on this view using data from developing countries also shows inequality limiting social
mobility (Andrews & Leigh, 2009; Corak, 2013). This fact, in turn, suggests that if there is lack
of social mobility among certain groups, this may then increase social distance2 between groups.
It also signals eroding social cohesion that could force groups to continuously engage in conflicts.
Dutta et al. (2014), for instance, established that ‘societies with low levels of inequality show
no conflict; groups engage in conflict only when inequality exceeds a certain threshold level’.
Arguing in a similar vein, albeit different from the inequality literature, evidence suggests that
the lack of interaction between two groups could lead them to higher social alienation (Esteban
and Ray, 1999; Esteban et al., 2012), while Jayadev and Reddy (2011) illustrate different types of
group-based inequality to capture the degree of segregation, clustering, and polarization between
groups that may contribute to social unrest and violence.
Under this backdrop of alienation of certain groups in a society, in this paper we use
the theoretical idea of ‘social distance’ as conceptualised in Akerlof (1997) and construct con-
sumption distance (as an indirect measure of social alienation) from a societal benchmark and
demonstrate to what extent higher/lower individual consumption distance is associated with
their social identities - castes3 and religions4. The term ’social distance’ refers to how an agent’s
1Banerjee and Duflo (2007), Basu and Mallick (2008), Kumar et al. (2009); and Mallick (2014)
2The concept of social distance was developed first by sociologist Bogardus (1933) which measures the degree
of closeness or acceptance that one feels toward other groups. In the recent years, the notion of social distance in
economics is defined as the degree of reciprocity that exists within a social interaction.
3In India, caste is classified into 4 sub-groups, namely - Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other
Backward Class (OBC) - categorized together as marginalised group - and High Caste (HC) or Privileged group.
The constitutional term for SC is Dalits; the term refers to their special status under the constitution as a
group entitled to special protection and to stop positive discrimination through reservations. This group accounts
for around 16% of total population. The constitutional term ST is Adivasis; this term refers to their special
status under the constitution as a group entitled to special protection and any positive discrimination through
reservations. This group accounts for around 13% of total population. The third group Other Backward Class
(OBC) has not been subject to the same discrimination of untouchables in India, but they are considered socially
and economically deprived like SC and ST after the Mandal Commission report, and the NSS has started collecting
data for this group since 1999-2000 survey. This group accounts for around 39% of total population. The privileged
group (HC) has complete privilege over other three groups and this group accounts for around 32% of total
population.
4In the case of religion, we strictly categorize it into two groups - Hindus and Muslims. According to Population
Census, Hindus account for around 88% and Muslims account for around 12% of total population of India.
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sense of belonging and aloofness from a desirable social outcome can determine the welfare of an
individual. It is not unusual to observe that consumption pattern of some social groups does not
dynamically co-move with the general rise in income (or consumption) at the aggregate level.
Although social identity is a multidimensional concept, a person’s identity is determined at
birth in terms of a religion and a particular sub-group. The household surveys conducted by the
Government of India identify a single identity to each household which makes our identification
strategy credible. In this regard, we raise two core questions. First, whether individuals from
some social groups are alienated more relative to other groups, or whether they are alienated
less when they get educated? Second, what would have happened to consumption differences
between groups if one exchanges their household characteristics? More specifically, this research
is focused on consumption behaviour of two social identities - castes and religions, but the results
can be generalised to similar socio-economic settings in other countries.
The paper uses quantile regression to answer the first question in assessing the consump-
tion distance across the distribution, and counterfactual decomposition method to answer the
second question. We use household-level data on consumption expenditure from National Sam-
ple Survey (NSS) for three rounds: 1993-94, 2004-05 and 2011-123 and performs the following
tasks. First, we construct a measure of consumption distance at household level using individual
consumption expenditure, and investigate whether a unique pattern (higher or lower consump-
tion distance) can be discerned across social identities, controlling for demographic and other
household characteristics, including educational attainment levels, while dealing with the endo-
geneity of education. Second, we also undertake a group-level comparison after exchanging group
characteristics in a counterfactual sense to study whether the conditional average consumption
gap between two groups tends to get wider across the distribution or rises over time.
Our results reveal that household consumption pattern is indeed influenced by individual
identities, while controlling for the effects of education, age, and household type. From the
distribution of raw consumption data, we find that there are multiple clusters (or equilibria)
indicating the existence of both poverty and growth traps. This is in line with the wider
literature that within-country income inequality has been on the rise, despite the reduction
in between-country inequality in the recent decades. Using household-level consumption, we
have focused on alienation as a form of individual distance from a group mean for different
social groups within a country in order to contribute to this issue of growing within-country
inequality.
We find that the consumption expenditure, when transformed in terms of distance as a
deviation from the group mean consumption, is non-unique across the distribution and among
social groups. The differences in consumption expenditure between groups have not changed
significantly over time for those households who are at the lower ladder of the consumption
expenditure distribution. However, households with education are found to have higher per
capita consumption relative to their group mean. In this context, we examine for the first
time in the NSS dataset the problem of endogeneity, using the number of schools and school
enrollment at the district level as exogenous instruments for educational attainment. Even with
this endogeneity correction, both marginalised social groups and minority religious group remain
alienated across the distribution, relative to their respective counterparts.
In particular, we find that (i) on average, the consumption distance within a social group is
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getting wider across the distribution and rising over time, implying alienation of the marginalised
and minority group households, even after 25 years of economic reforms; (ii) the consumption
distance of both marginalised and non-Hindus groups, without and with controlling for endo-
geneity, however remains similar at the bottom end of the distance distribution, while it gets
wider at the top end, (iii) After exchanging the group characteristics among both social identi-
ties - castes and religions, the estimated consumption gap across the distribution is observed to
rise over time in both unmatched and matched samples. In light of our findings, we conclude
that the evidence of rising consumption distance across the entire distribution, over time, and
across social groups could signal heightened social alienation and thus possible group conflicts.
Despite resounding success in India’s growth in the recent decades, the rising ’consumption dis-
tance’ across social divides appears to reflect continued within-country economic inequality - the
solution of which will require more inclusive policy decisions including promoting education.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the litera-
ture. Section 3 provides data description, outlines strategies for the construction of consumption
distance, and presents preliminary results. In Section 4 we present our main results (without
and with accounting for endogeneity concerns). Section 4.3 discusses the counterfactual decom-
position results and the robustness exercise. Finally, section 5 provides a critical summary of
the main results and their possible policy relevance.
2 A brief review of the Literature
The literature has emphasised to what extent social affinities (caste and religious affiliation) gov-
ern different channels of economic development. In this section, we look at some closely related
studies which have observed how caste or religious identity matters in economic development.
Caste affiliation and religious barrier are not new in India and deeply rooted since independence
in the Indian society. Despite various efforts by the government since independence, it has been
observed that marginalized groups had low occupational mobility and were engaged mostly as
agricultural labourers or in self-employed agricultural work (Gang, Sen and Yun, 2012), which
implies significant social inequality between high and low castes. Using caste affiliation as a key
factor, many studies as cited earlier have tried to explain its impact on development including
market insurance, bank credit, poverty, and income inequality. However, what is less known in
the literature is that to what extent an individual’s social identity might have had a differen-
tial effect on their consumption pattern relative to the average level of consumption across the
distribution, following two decades of policy reforms in India?
One possible reason for the social hierarchy is to look at the historical legacy between high
caste and low castes, where high caste individuals do not allow people from the lower castes to
share the same resources. As a consequence of this, lower castes always had low mobility in
the labour market and thus reported higher poverty level and income inequality (Desai and
Dubey, 2012). The second possible reason is through the development channel where low-caste
individuals in India are observed to have benefited less from recent growth process compared
to their counterpart in the high caste. Both explanations have been discussed intensively in
the literature with respect to social inequality, the wage gap, and caste-based discrimination.
For instance, Kijima (2006) uses NSS data for the periods 1983-1999 and has reported that the
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disparities of living standards among SC/ST (marginalized groups) compared to non-SC/ST
(privileged group) still remain very high. He finds that due to social differences between non-
SC/ST and SC/ST, SC/ST have less access to public goods and thus possess lower human and
physical capital. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) observed that social identities are linked with
low paid jobs among SC/ST. This suggests that the disparities of living standards between
SC/ST and non-SC/ST households are largely attributable to different returns to schooling.
In order to explain the existence of the large disparity between high and low castes, some
recent studies have linked this to the concept of conspicuous consumption behaviour, where
economically disadvantaged groups try to lower the consumption distance by spending more
on leisure/luxury items to gain higher social status. For instance, Khamis et al. (2012) use
India Human Development Survey (IHDS) data to investigate if spending on consumption items
can be characterized by social identities (defined by caste and religious affiliations). The au-
thors used those consumption items which people are quick to observe and which they associate
with higher income so that such items confer status on those who consume them (conspicu-
ous consumption). They observe that marginalized groups spend nine percent more on visible
consumption than high caste, while Muslims in Indian society spend eleven percent less, after
controlling for differences in permanent income and demographic composition of households.
Understanding social exclusion based on group or club formation has suggested that India
has become more socially disintegrated in the recent decades and is moving towards being a less
cohesive society. For instance, Bandyopadhyay (2012) using data on income across Indian states
suggests that India was more cohesive before reform in the sixties and started diverging after the
seventies and the divergence is observed to be more acute in the nineties. She finds that after the
nineties, India has been divided into two societal clubs. In a similar spirit, Mitra and Ray (2014),
using the concept of group convergence and dataset on Hindu-Muslim violence between 1950
and 1995 for three consecutive rounds from National Sample Surveys (NSS): 1983,1987-88 and
1993-94, find that Hindu prosperity reduces fatalities from conflicts between religious groups.
For instance, they observe that a 1% increase in Hindu per-capita expenditure is predicted to
decrease casualties by anywhere between 3-7%, while the same increase in Muslim per-capita
expenditure increases casualties by 3-5%.
Despite the recent high economic growth, India’s consumption inequality across caste
and religions has been creating a buzz in the academic and policy circles. The rise in within-
country inequality raises concerns about a decline in opportunities for the deprived sections of
the population in India. This research thus fills a gap in this recent literature on social inequality,
with implications for lowering social alienation via human capital formation.
3 Data and Preliminary observations
3.1 Data
In this section, we describe the data and present some preliminary observations leading to the
main empirical results in the following sections. We use data on monthly per-capita consumption
expenditure (in real terms) at household level. In India, the NSS collects this data across different
geographical regions, demographics, and among social groups. These data are collected every
5
five years and have been used as an important source to estimate poverty/inequality over time in
many studies. For our investigation, we use data from three quinquennial rounds - 50th (period
1993-94), 61st (period 2004-05) and 68th (period 2011-12). These surveys cover the whole
country, except some remote villages. In each survey period, the same sample villages/blocks
have been allotted for the survey with a view to ensuring uniform spread. A stratified multi-
stage sample design was adopted in each period. In the rural sector, each district is generally
counted as a separate stratum (populous districts are split into two or more strata), whereas,
in the urban sector, strata are formed within the NSS region based on population size of cities.
From the 61st round, the stratification method has slightly changed. For each district, the rural
and urban strata are further divided into two sub-strata.
The questionnaire records demographic details such as age, sex, marital status, educational
attainment level, religion, social groups and information about occupation and industry. It also
collects monthly total household expenditure on food and non-food items over 30 days and 365
days recall periods. In our analysis, we have considered age, years of schooling, castes, religions
and household type.
Moreover, in this study we distinguish households’ monthly per capita consumption expen-
diture based on 30-days recall period as an indicator of welfare measure in various sub-groups:
(i) by rural-urban, (ii) by different educational attainment level, (iii) by social classes, and (iv)
by different age cohorts. In Table 1, we present the detailed summary statistics of the average
distribution of monthly per capita consumption expenditure across different demographic char-
acteristics for each selected survey period at the mean level and at two interquartile ranges. The
individual consumption expenditure for all rounds is expressed in real terms using state-level
poverty lines that differ for rural and urban areas. Following Lahiri et al. (2012), we express all
consumption expenditures in real terms of 1993 rural and urban Maharashtra poverty lines. Such
transformation helps cross-state comparisons in real terms with a specific benchmark. In order
to understand consumption expenditure differential among different sub-groups and over time,
we use head of the households age 15 and above in order to avoid questions on intra-household
distribution, such as the use of consumption expenditure per adult equivalent or equivalence
scales5. We begin our empirical investigation by undertaking a preliminary data analysis.
3.2 Preliminary observations
 Observation 1: Inter-quartile differences in consumption-expenditure
In Table 1, some general trends of consumption expenditure for different social categories
are presented. We observe that the mean consumption at the national level and across
different categories has increased approximately about one-third in 2011 compared to 1993.
However, consumption expenditure at inter-quartile ranges displays varied patterns with
5The rationale behind not using the equal division of consumption assumption within the same household in
the current analysis is that it rejects the assumption that the consumption allocation does not vary with the
source of income in the household. A large theoretical and empirical literature (see Browing et al 1994; Lundberg,
Pollak and Wales, 1997; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Homey, 1981; Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Browning
and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002; Donni, 2007) on this issue have also pointed out that
if the source of income within household is not consistent, then use of any measure of equivalence scales will
produce an inaccurate trend in consumption behaviour over time. Regardless of this, we have used the square
root scaling to check the robustness of our baseline results and the estimated results are presented in Table 7 as
Model 2.
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households at 25th quartile consuming nearly half of the mean consumption expenditure,
whereas at 75th quartile these differences are observed approximately 33 percent higher
than mean consumption level and over time. To confirm the differences in consumption
level at two inter-quartiles, a mean test is also performed for all groups.
Table 1: Consumption (real terms) distribution across different social identities at mean and two inter-
quartile ranges
1993 2004 2011
Mean 25th 75th Mean 25th 75th Mean 25th 75th
All India 451.46 230.97 499.14 498.73 249.55 569.70 627.93 313.71 712.50
(1.799) (0.513) (1.897) (1.478) (0.473) (1.714) (2.194) (0.665) (2.137)
Caste
SC 326.43 197.57 369.48 439.01 231.71 491.45 502.01 275.29 554.30
(2.481) (1.006) (2.496) (3.197) (1.059) (3.306) (4.991) (1.215) (4.278)
ST 333.27 198.34 369.75 402.86 221.35 455.30 483.20 267.86 560.60
(3.528) (0.998) (2.846) (3.619) (1.477) (3.234) (3.793) (1.386) (5.001)
OBC - - - 464.17 242.99 527.91 587.65 310.48 661.86
(2.228) (0.737) (2.436) (3.094) (1.003) (3.273)
HC 500.65 250.60 560.08 598.70 285.69 705.54 792.66 381.43 919.36
(2.349) (0.626) (2.501) (2.898) (1.033) (3.605) (4.712) (1.512) (5.391)
Religions
Hindu 452.80 230.54 502.55 502.30 249.28 576.23 631.66 313.11 716.04
(2.031) (0.571) (2.009) (1.683) (0.547) (1.946) (2.546) (0.749) (2.527)
Islam 394.86 225.27 440.67 450.12 240.95 509.70 558.27 306.20 636.08
(3.725) (1.473) (4.258) (3.761) (1.225) (3.759) (4.758) (1.600) (4.692)
N 69152 69152 69152 109320 109320 109320 89623 89623 89623
Note: Consumption expenditure is defined in real terms.
 Observation 2: Density distribution of consumption expenditure
We first plot the unconditional distributional pattern of consumption expenditure and look
at the shift in consumption behaviour at the aggregate level and over time. This relates to
our research question whether an increase in consumption expenditure is directly linked
to the recent concern on increase (decrease) in social alienation, to the possibilities of
articulated rebellion and revolt, and to the existence of social unrest in various parts of
the society. The distributional pattern of consumption distance is therefore important to
be analysed.
Traditionally, any shift in consumption (income) level to the right of the distribution is
always considered as a positive sign of growth, although the distribution could be skewed at
either end indicating clustering or polarization. We use consumption distance as an indirect
measure of social alienation and examine the increase (or decrease) in social alienation
during the last two decades of growth in India. We assume that individuals at both ends
of the consumption distribution plotted in Figure 1 represent two different and isolated
groups of the same society. In other words, we assume that the households which are
extremely on the left of the consumption expenditure distribution are poor 6 and therefore
6We consider those individuals poor who consume less than the official poverty line
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they have less access to economic resources. On the contrary, households on the extreme
right end of the same distribution are considered as non-poor (as their consumption level
is above the mean consumption) and thus they have full access to available resources. In
other words, those households on the right of the distribution tend to be more integrated
with the societal norm, but among them, some groups are still alienated (consume less)
relative to their counterpart at different points of the distribution.
In Figure 1 the varied pattern of consumption distribution for the periods 1993, 2004,
and 2011 confirms our contention and clearly shows clusters at both ends. A prolonged
right tail implies that a very large number of households is consuming above the mean
consumption expenditure. As expected, we also find the higher mean (see Table 1) for the
year 2011 compared to both 1993 and 2004, indicating a real improvement in consumption
expenditure reflecting a favourable impact of policy reforms in the last two decades. The
extreme right mode in the same distribution can be thought of as a ‘growth trap’, where
some individuals have full access to economic resources, enjoying all benefits from economic
development.
Figure 1: Average distribution of consumption expenditure over time
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In order to confirm the normality of the distribution, the Jarque-Bera normality test is
used to examine whether the sample data have skewness and kurtosis matching a normal
distribution. The skewness and kurtosis for three time points7 indicate that all distribu-
tions are significantly different from a normal distribution.
 Observation 3: Consumption gap among social identities
The observed clusters over time in observation 2 reflect that some individuals are con-
suming above the mean consumption level. A similar pattern is also observed for food vs
non-food and cereal vs non-cereal distribution8. However, it is not examined yet how these
7Skewness (SK) and Kurtosis(KU) are as follows: 1.47 and 4.67 (SK and KU, 1993); 0.68 and 3.76 (SK and
KU, 2004); and 1.38 and 4.94 (SK and KU, 2011).
8These results are available upon request from the authors.
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differences in consumption level are characterized between two social identities. To confirm
this, we have further looked at the consumption expenditure gap between both social iden-
tities - caste and religion, and plotted them as in Figures 2 and 3. The consumption gap
between two groups is calculated based on their average differences in consumption level
over time and in each state of India. The visual inspection of these graphs suggests that
both religious groups and castes are divided into many clusters across the distribution.
Figure 2: Average consumption gap between Hindus and non-Hindus
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Source: Authors’ calculation
Figure 3: Average consumption gap between Privileged and Marginalized groups
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The observed clusters at both ends of the distribution in observations 2 and 3 suggest
two different but contemporary issues in development economics. First, each mode in
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the distribution reflects the possibility of ‘poverty trap’ and ‘growth trap’ at both ends.
Second, this figure relates to a contemporary issue in econometric theory which says that
if the dependent variable of the regression (in our case, consumption expenditure and
normalized consumption expenditure) is multi-modal, then the estimation of parameters
assuming unimodality of the dependent variable would provide biased estimates. More-
over, the information content at other parts of the distribution is disregarded or averaged
out and this would affect our inference on consumption behaviour across social identities.
The finding of multi-modality is not unusual and has been consistently reported in extant
empirical research on employment, income distribution, and consumption behaviour. Sur-
prisingly, only a few studies have adopted alternative estimation methods, such as quantile
regression, to address the issue of multiple modes in the distribution.
3.3 Empirical strategy for measuring consumption distance
In order to examine differential patterns in consumption distribution among different social
identities, we use quantile regression method, and to describe consumption distance, we adopt
a method of standardization in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Quantile regression method
The unconditional pattern of consumption expenditure in the density plots and our preliminary
investigation of consumption expenditure over time and across social identities have provided
enough evidence as to why one should examine its effect across the distribution of consumption
expenditure rather than concentrating at the mean. A key aspect of understanding the effect
of socio-economic characteristics is to employ an estimation method that can be informative in
addressing heterogeneity, whilst also robustly presenting parameter estimates at various points
of the distribution of the dependent variable.
To understand these differential spending patterns among different social identities, we
use Koenker and Bassett (1978) quantile regression approach. With this approach, one can
estimate the change in the parameter distribution at specific quantiles so that the response
variable produced by a one unit change in the predictor variable can be gauged at both higher
and lower quantiles of the distribution9. This can be specified as:
Qθ(Y |X) = Xβθ +  (1)
where X is a set of standard control variables such as age, household size, education level,
religion and caste. θ represents quantiles to be estimated between (0, 1).
One of the most interesting advantages provided by quantile regression is its semi-parametric
nature that avoids assumptions about parametric distribution of regression errors and makes
quantile regression especially useful when dealing with heteroskedastic errors.
9The superiority of this approach in relation to mean-based approach can be gauged by its statistical properties.
If the response of the distribution to certain endogenous shocks (in our case, consumption distance) is true for
a certain quantile, say at 10% and if it remains consistent throughout the entire range of quantiles, one can say
that the estimated parameters represent a true relationship.
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3.3.2 Standardisation of consumption expenditure
Understanding the differential patterns of consumption expenditure across the distribution is a
key objective of this paper. It is not only important but also necessary to understand to what
extent an individual’s own consumption is away from the average of their own group. If this
difference rises over time, then one can say that this particular society is facing the problem
of social alienation. In particular, if there is no consumption differential within a group, then
each individual should have the same level of consumption and hence there will be no sign of
consumption distance or alienation for a given identity. The households on the right of the
distribution, consuming more than the mean level of consumption, could be more integrated
with the societal norm, but they could only be alienated or experience relative inequality if we
compare them to their counterparts in a privileged group.
To conceptualize this idea, given the information on consumption (as a proxy for income),
we measure each individual household’s consumption level from a reference point, say mean
of the consumption expenditure distribution of their own group, and divide by its standard
deviation (see the detailed steps in Appendix A). One can change this reference point from
mean to another reference point such as median or maximum/saturation level (as in Kumar et
al., 2009) of consumption expenditure to calculate this distance. This, however, will not change
the interpretation of the estimates. This can be represented in the following way as:
discit =
(xci − x¯
σ
)
(2)
where discit is distance from mean consumption level of a household’s own group as refer-
ence in a given period t. xci is individual consumption expenditure, x¯ is the mean consumption
expenditure, and σ is standard deviation of consumption in the respective group. Measuring
deviation of individual consumption in this manner has two attractive properties. First, it is
invariant to changes in units. Second, one can directly observe the effect of one σ change in in-
dependent variable on the dependent variable. The steps involved in normalization is discussed
in Appendix A.
Using equation 2, we calculate unconditional consumption expenditure distribution dif-
ferences for both social identities from the mean of their own group in the beginning and the
recent survey year during the reform period which are plotted in Figures 4 and 5. The inter-
esting facts these graphs provide are the following. First, it suggests that alienation has risen
at the extreme top quantiles whereas consumption expenditure differences at any quantile from
the 30th to 60th quantiles and for each social identity remain the same. Second, the widened
difference at 90th quantile between privileged to marginalized groups and Hindu to non-Hindus
over time has given a clear indication of greater alienation at the top end of the distribution. At
the bottom end i.e., at 10th quantile, and for both social identities, differences in consumption
expenditure remain the same, suggesting that the poor has not remarkably experienced the same
benefit from growth as individuals at the top end. Third, comparing the shift in consumption
expenditure with reference to zero line, our finding suggests that the privileged (HC) group has
benefited more compared to marginalized groups (SC and SC) especially after 60th and above
quantiles. A similar pattern is also observed between Hindus and non-Hindus, suggesting that
11
Figure 4: Normalized consumption expenditure distribution of privileged and marginalized
groups in 1993 and 2011.
Source: Authors’ calculation
Hindus have benefited more from growth compared to non-Hindus.
In our empirical results, we use this normalized consumption for distance and looked at
the impact of social identities on consumption distance. For better intuition of our results, two
important points are worth noting. First, as we move from bottom to top end of the distribution,
one should expect the same sign of a particular covariate. Second, the coefficient difference from
median to lower quantiles and from median to higher quantiles, in absolute terms, should decline
over time with both the level of consumption and the normalized consumption expenditure. In
12
Figure 5: Normalized consumption expenditure distribution of Hindus and non-Hindus in 1993
and 2011.
1993
Source: Authors’ calculation
Table 2, we present the expected sign for our covariates.
4 Empirical findings and analysis
India’s growth dynamics in the post-economic reform period since the early 1990s present an
interesting contrast in terms of real GDP per capita, education, and consumption expenditure, as
13
Table 2: Expected sign of coefficients across the quantiles
Variables Expected sign
Marginalized groups -
Non-hindus -
Education +
Age +
Regular earnings +
casual labour -
Non-agriculture -
Others type work +
Source: Authors’ predictions
there has been an uneven rise in consumption distance across social groups.10 At the aggregate
level, we show that the rising consumption distance appears to coexist with higher level of per
capita income at region level within India. Using state-level per capita income data for those
3 survey years, we show that although there is a positive correlation between alienation and
development, there has been a downward slope change over time (see Figure 8). Besides, it is
likely that education might have helped improving consumption pattern among different social
groups and thereby lowering alienation.
We begin our analysis by presenting the expected relationships between consumption level
and social identities along with the household level control variables, showing the advantage of
QR approach over a mean-based OLS regression. Consumption distance constructed using
the approach in the previous sub-section could reflect how social identities are important in
determining consumption behaviour across distribution and over time. In Table 6, we present
the result using consumption expenditure across the distribution whereas in Table 3, we use
normalized value of consumption expenditure, as a dependent variable, and present the estimates
using quantile regression; however for the discussion purpose and to save space we only present
three quantiles - 10th (lower), 50th (median) and 90th (higher). The results for other quantiles,
using the level of consumption expenditure as a dependent variable, are graphically presented
in Appendix A (see Figures 5-8). The solid red line corresponds to the OLS coefficients and red
dashed lines are confidence bands. The black dashed-dot lines are quantile coefficients and the
dark shadow area reflects confidence intervals.
Our aim is to show the effect of social identities on normalized consumption expenditure
i.e., on consumption distance. We, therefore, using Table 3, as a baseline result, discuss the rest
of the results. In our baseline results, we assume that education is exogenous and thus does not
directly govern individual consumption expenditure. Under this assumption, both OLS and QR
estimation will result in unbiased and efficient estimates.
10Since the inception of economic reform in 1991, the growth of real GDP per capita has shown an unprecedented
rise averaging about 5.6% per annum, with literacy improvement among young and household consumption
expenditure with manifold growth over the years.
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4.1 Baseline results
As mentioned before, the mean-based OLS approach only examines the effect at mean, and thus
ignores the entire distribution. Therefore the variability in consumption distance at various
points of the consumption distance distribution for different social groups can be better revealed
through the QR based conditional distribution approach.
 Impact of caste on consumption distance
Examining the effect of caste, as a social identity, on consumption distance, we find some
important and interesting facts.
First, looking at the median quantile coefficients, we do not observe large variation over
time in marginalized groups. The negative coefficients for marginalized group across the dis-
tribution and over time, however, suggest that the marginalized groups are not better off than
their counterpart privileged group even after 25 years of reform. In fact, our finding suggests
that there is no confounded effect of redistributive policies11, which have been in place since the
1950s in order to improve their social status. The possible reason for such wide difference in
their consumption distance could be linked to existing historical hierarchies between marginal-
ized and privileged groups which lead them to accept low paying jobs even if marginalized groups
are endowed with better human capital. As a result of this, they experience persistent gap in
consumption expenditure relative to their counterpart privileged group.
Second, comparing the coefficient difference from the median quantile to the bottom quan-
tile, and the median quantile to the top quantile, and in each period, we observe that those
individuals who consume above the mean consumption are more integrated but they are still
alienated compared to their counterpart at the same quantile (Table 3). For instance, compar-
ing the coefficient value (-0.056) at the 10th quantile to the coefficient value (-0.079) of median
quantile, and from median quantile to the coefficient value (-0.167) at the 90th quantile in 1993,
showing the presence of strong relative inequality at the top end of the distribution.
 Impact of religion on consumption distance
Looking at the impact of religious affiliation as a social identity on consumption distance,
our finding shows that non-hindus are alienated relative to hindus at any quantile, although there
is an improvement at the median quantile in each survey round. Our finding strongly suggests
that non-Hindus even after thirty years of reform are still placed in a low socio-economic position.
These findings thus lead to two important implications. First, it links to political incentivization
issues of economic resources which are normally used during electoral campaigns and frequently
debated in the literature on the relative bias of allocation of resources between Hindus and
non-Hindus. Second, our results link to conflict theory on social identity and provide reasons
for social riots between two groups. For example, Varshney (2001) observed that difference in
economic status between Hindus and Muslims in Ahmedabad, the Indian city of Gujarat, led to
the much-condemned conflict which killed people from both religions. Another implication of
11In India, affirmative policies are well known in the form of reservation policy or quota system for scheduled
castes and tribes, where a certain percentage of jobs or school vacancies must be reserved for members of these
groups.
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these findings also links to the recent argument of aspirations failure (Ray, 2003; and Dalton et
al., 2014), which suggests that if differences in consumption level persist for a long time, then
Hindus may dominate non-Hindus in the long run.
 Impact of education on consumption distance
It is theoretically argued in the literature that the rise in human capital formation in any
society can offset various external negative consequences of both economic and social develop-
ment. In this regard, we have also examined whether the rise in human capital has helped in
reducing social inequality or not. There is no doubt that since the 1990s, i.e., following economic
reforms, India has experienced unprecedented gains in educational attainment both at aggre-
gate level and across the states. Indeed, upward mobility in consumption expenditure across all
educational categories is observed (see Table 1). This has, then, raised two important questions
in the context of this research. First, do households with higher level of education across the
consumption distribution improve an individual’s relative position in the social hierarchy and
thus lower consumption inequality in a society? Research on this view, using education as a con-
spicuous good or signaling status, showed that lack of education has not only hindered the social
mechanisms but has also affected the national productivity (Khamis et al., 2012). An interesting
account of such practice can be found, for instance, in the work of Srinivas (1956) and Ambed-
kar (1944) where both individual socially-inherited position and different levels of educational
attainment have been used to understand its interdependence from the growth perspective.
In light of our research questions, the estimated results in Table 6 strongly suggest that
the effect of education has not only improved the level of consumption across the distribution
but it has also helped lowering consumption distance across the distribution and over time (see
Table 3). For instance, its effect is noticeable more at higher (90th) quantile compared to lower
(10th) quantile of the consumption distance. We observe that the education difference from
median to 90th quantile in 2011 has declined by one-third compared to the period 1993 for the
same quantiles where it is not the same from 10th quantile to 50th quantile and over time.
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Our finding is consistent with the theoretical insights of Gradstein and Justman (2002),
who have suggested that improving human capital should minimize social distance. This also
means that households those who are endowed with the low level of human capital are less
socially integrated compared to those who are endowed with the higher level of human capital.
The interaction between education and social identity shows that the households with higher level
of education in both groups have significantly benefited in minimising their distance as reflected
in lower coefficients over time (see Table 7 of Appendix B). The interactive effect therefore reveals
that education has played a significant role in reducing the consumption disparity among those
who are consuming above the mean consumption level.
 Effect of household types on consumption distance
Analysing the relationship between different household types on consumption distance, we
find mixed results for some household types. However, a strong presence of social alienation,
regardless of the household types, is observed for those who are above the median consumption
level. Overall, it is observed that households those who are regular earners are less alienated
than those who are classified in other categories. A slope difference test is also performed to test
the slope inequality from 10th to 50th quantile and from 50th to 90th quantile with the level of
consumption (see Table 3).
The results in this section show the impact of socio-economic indicators on consumption
distance at the mean and across distribution. In sum, our results strongly suggest that indi-
vidual social identity matters to govern the consumption differences across distribution while
the mitigating effect has been noticed between educational attainment level and consumption
distance.
 Robustness test - I
As argued above, changing the individual reference point from mean to another reference
point such as the median does not change the direction and magnitude of the main results already
discussed. To confirm this, several other alternative reference points are also considered. The
obtained results from these reference points are presented in Appendix B in Table 7.
4.2 Dealing with Endogeneity - IV quantile regression approach
Our baseline result indicates that education has played a significant role for both social identities
in reducing their consumption distance over time. Households with higher level of education
tend to be more integrated in our baseline results. However, possible endogeneity of education
suggests that the education variable could be correlated with the error term, which we address by
using the instrumental variable regression. To confirm this endogeneity, we run the Wu-Hausman
test12, which rejects the null of no endogeneity of education (see Table 4). Chernozhukov and
12To show the endogeneity of education, the reduced form of the baseline model is run by taking education as a
dependent variable with all the other exogenous variables, and the predicted value (say eduhat) is obtained. Then,
the residual (edures=education-eduhat) is added to the original model and tested for significance in the baseline
regression. As the coefficient on ’edures’ is statistically different from zero, we can conclude that education is
indeed endogenous.
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Hansen (2005 and 2008) instrumental variable quantile regression (IVQR13) is further used to
obtain consistent and robust coefficient estimates across the distribution. The underlying idea
of the IVQR approach is described in Appendix A.
As part of the instrumental variable approach, we need to identify valid instruments for
education which satisfies the exogeneity assumption. In order to satisfy the exclusion restric-
tion on our endogenous variable of interest (education), we need at least two instruments and
therefore we use total number of schools and total school enrollment in each district in every
state for the two survey rounds - 2004 and 2011. Our estimation is now more robust in address-
ing the endogeneity of education (years of schooling at household level). This data come from
”http://schoolreportcards.in” starting from 2000 onwards, and we therefore test the endogene-
ity of education only for two survey years - 2004 and 2011. The rationale behind choosing the
number of schools and school enrolment as instruments is that it is directly related to the years
of schooling at household level and therefore independent from the level of individual consump-
tion. These instruments suggest that districts with higher number of schools and higher level of
enrollment tend to have households with higher level of education, but they do not govern the
consumption pattern directly. Thus the total number of schools and total enrollment are the
most relevant instruments to solve possible endogeneity of education. The validity test for the
instruments14 at mean level and the results obtained from IVQR are presented in Table 4 and
across the distribution.
Overall, we find the instruments relevant which have the expected effect on the endogenous
variable. The IVQR results show that the effects of social identities, education and other control
variables on consumption distance are consistent with our baseline results. Compared to Table
3, the estimated coefficient is large in magnitude and statistically significant at least at 5% level
for all control variables. The larger effect implies a downward bias in our baseline estimates,
which according to our interpretation above, would suggest that improving human capital helps
minimise alienation in the society and its larger effects are noticeable at higher end of the
distribution.
The relevance and validity of the instrument used is also confirmed by the under-identification
and weak-identification tests ( 0.05) along with the over-identification test. The estimated test
results are presented in Table 4. The first-stage results demonstrate that our set of instruments
is indeed capable of explaining a large fraction of the variation. The F-tests easily reject the null
hypothesis of no effect from the instrument set. In addition to the F-statistics reported in the
first-stage regressions, we find that both the Kleibegen & Paap (2006) LM- and F-test reject the
null hypothesis of under-identification and weak identification. The Hansen over-identification
J-test examines whether the instruments are orthogonal to the error in the regression, and the
high p-value suggests that the instruments are valid as we do not reject the null hypothesis of
no over-identification.
In general, the instrumental variable approach appears to be supportive of our baseline
13The IVQR approach is known to be computationally efficient for a small number of endogenous variables
(which is typically the case in our investigation). It should also be noted that the IVQR captures the impact of
changes in covariates upon a conditional distribution of dependent variable, in very much the same way that the
QR regression measures.
14To the best of authors’ knowledge, there are no sound test procedures to establish the strict identification
test at each quantile. Therefore, we only satisfy the relevance and exogeneity condition at mean and compare the
validity of results close to the median quantile (50th) IVQR.
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findings. Improvements in educational attainments minimize consumption distance across social
identities, emphasising educations welfare-promoting and status-changing roles in consumption
dynamics. This is in line with the literature that an improvement in human capital can minimize
the effects of social alienation (Gradstein and Justman, 2002). In other words, our results suggest
that the households endowed with low level of human capital are less diversified and socially
less integrated compared to those who are endowed with higher level of human capital. As
educational attainment rises from primary to tertiary level, the positive effect of education
on consumption distance distribution suggests that households with higher level of education
tend to be more integrated than being alienated, as they are able to consume more than the
group mean. In light of this evidence, it is not unusual to anticipate that with better level
of educational attainment, the consumption level gap for caste (privileged-marginalised) and
religion (Hindus-Muslims) based groups should be lower over time.
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To confirm this, we use the counterfactual decomposition approach as proposed by Machado
and Mata15 (hereafter MM, 2005) in section 4.3 where we examine systematically the consump-
tion differential for both social identities across the consumption distribution in unmatched and
matched samples.
4.3 Digging deeper: Counterfactual approach
In the previous sub-sections, we discussed our first research question as: to what extent social
identities determine consumption distance across the distribution at household level. The ques-
tion that needs to be explored is what would have occurred if the observed characteristics of the
privileged or majority religion group were assigned to the other group as a counterfactual for
a group-level analysis. The main idea here is to understand whether the estimated consump-
tion gap between two groups can be lower if a counterfactual group is created by assigning the
covariates of the privileged group to the marginalised group (or from Hindus to non-Hindus).
We have already looked at the unconditional pattern of consumption expenditure gap for
both social identities - caste and religion, through density plots which show large consumption
gap in both groups and over time, indicating an uneven society. Thus the MM counterfactual
decomposition can help confirm whether the estimated gap can be lowered if the characteristics
of the high consumption group are assigned to the low consumption group. In Table 5, the
results obtained from the counterfactual decomposition are presented.
First, the consumption gap rises over time (see column: 1, 5, and 9 in Table 5) for both
identities (religion and caste). Considering the case of religion in 1993, the estimated gap is
higher across quantiles and we observed approximately two-fold higher estimated consumption
gap at the 90th quantile (0.198) compared to the 10th quantile (0.095). Both unobserved (column
3, 7, and 11 in Table 5) and observed (column 4, 8, and 12 in Table 5) coefficient effects have
also marked a sharp rise. We observe that the proportion of total gap in consumption is due to
the unobserved inequality (column 3, 7, and 11 in Table 5) and it is higher in 2011 compared
to 1993 which explains why the estimated overall gap has grown twice as much.
What is notable is that the estimates of the gap exhibit monotonic rise for the minority
religious group which is consistent across bottom and top quantiles. In particular, we observe
that for 1993 the estimated gap is 0.095 at 10th quantile, which has increased to 0.153 and 0.184
in 2004 and 2011 respectively. A similar trend is observed for 90th quantile, although the rate of
change at this quantile is noticeably smaller than at 10th quantile. The observed overall trend
comes from the unexplained part (column 3,7, and 11 in Table 5) for all quantiles. Our aim
here was to show that even after exchanging the characteristics of the high consumption group
to low consumption group, the big part of the estimated consumption gap (59% at the median
quantile) is still being explained by the high consumption group (Hindus) consuming more than
the counterfactual group (Muslims with Hindu characteristics) possibly due to their inherent
social position; nevertheless the counterfactual minority group with exchanged characteristics is
certainly better off relative to their own characteristics, explaining 40% of the gap at the median
quantile in 2011.
When caste differences are taken as a measure of social identity, the decomposition of esti-
15The steps of Machado and Mata and the matching approach are discussed in detail in Appendix A
22
mated consumption gap depicts a similar pattern that the privileged group still consumes more
than the counterfactual marginalised group, explaining around 77% of the estimated consump-
tion gap at the median quantile in 2011-12, suggesting other inherent identity-specific social
factors as possible contributors to consumption gap between groups. We find an overall rise in
the gap over time at lower quantile (from 0.201 in 1993 to 0.310 in 2011), with a slight decline
(0.194) in 2004. At higher quantile (90th), we do not find any marked rise in the gap, although,
at median quantile, a monotonic rise is still observed over the years.
 Robustness test - II
As a robustness, we further investigate how sensitive the above results are to a correction
of specification bias in unmatched samples. To correct this, we employ N˜opo (2008) matching
approach and then re-estimate the counterfactual model for both social identities. In Table 8, we
report the results of counterfactual decomposition at various quantiles after matching individual
characteristics for each social identity, i.e., caste affiliation of individuals. The decomposition
is undertaken between privileged and marginalized groups for all survey years and across the
distribution. An important and striking result that emerges after matching is that there is
observed persistence and monotonic rise in consumption gap across quantiles (for each survey
year). This can be seen by comparing the 10th, 50th and 90th quantiles of consumption gap
(see column: 1, 5, and 9 of Table 8). For instance, in 1993-94, the gap at 10th quantile is 0.201,
which has increased to 0.245 at median quantile and observed almost twice at 90th quantile
(0.389) compared to 10th quantile.
Similar trend is observed for 2004-05 and 2011-12 surveys. We also observe a persistent
rise in consumption gap over time between privileged and marginalized groups during 1993-94
and 2011-12 at 10th quantile (from 0.201 to 0.262). At 90th quantile, this gap also manifested an
increasing trend from 0.389 in 1993-94 to 0.444 in 2011-12. However, we observed a significant
and larger increase in gap at median quantile (from 0.245 to 0.390 between these two sample
years).
In sum, the trend of rising consumption gap is similar to the unmatched sample case
(Table 5); however the extent of increase in consumption gap is different - for instance, in Table
5 and for privileged-marginalized case, the temporal rise in consumption gap goes from 0.251 in
1993-94 to 0.382 in 2011-12 at 50th quantile, which is slightly smaller than the one for matched
sample (which goes from 0.245 to 0.390 in 1993-94 and 2011-12 respectively). We also notice that
at the lower quantile, the consumption gap is larger in unmatched sample between 1993-94 and
2011-12 than in the matched sample. These inferences of our finding are graphically presented
in Figure 6 and compared with Figure 7.
Our overall conclusion from the matching exercise is as follows: (i) (across quantile and
over time) the overall trend in consumption gap by social identities is similar to the matched
one. This establishes robustness of our results irrespective of sample design and differences in
characteristics. (ii) By matching individuals’ characteristics, we find slightly smaller persistence
effects of consumption gap and that the results between matched and unmatched vary consider-
ably at lower and higher quantiles. This latter result points to the possible distortionary effect
that the matched samples may experience at low and high end of the distribution.
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Figure 6: Consumption gap between Privileged and Marginalized groups - unmatched samples
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Figure 7: Consumption gap between Privileged and Marginalized groups - matched samples
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper was to incorporate the theoretical idea of Akerlof (1997)’s
social distance theory and to understand how individual affiliation to any particular social group
explains their alienation. In the recent years, concerns have been raised about lack of social
cohesion despite the continued high growth in many emerging market economies. Our empirical
evidence on multimodal distribution of consumption expenditure lends support to the idea of
multiple equilibria or multiple clusters/modes in the consumption distribution. Given little
empirical evidence on this issue of alienation, in this paper using household survey data from
India, we estimated the effects of inherited social identity on consumption distance as a measure
of alienation. The main reason for using consumption deviation from group mean is that group
members in a particular identity are endowed with similar attributes and experience similar
social conditions in their respective community groups.
We calculated distance for each group from the mean consumption of their own group,
which clearly implies that the groups are facing within-group inequality but we cannot ignore
between-group inequality. We examined whether one group’s distance (from a specific norm or
threshold) is lower than the other group. Even after 25 years of economic reform, we find that
the identified social groups (marginalised and minority religious groups) remain alienated in the
distance distribution. Having controlled for the effects of education, age, and household type,
we found that there is significant evidence of a monotonic rise in consumption distance across
quantiles and over time, and the distance of two groups (marginalized groups in terms of caste,
and for non-Hindus in terms of religion) relative to their counterpart gets minimised with the
help of higher educational attainment. In addition, we re-estimated our base line regressions
considering two exogenous instruments namely number of schools and school enrollment in
order to satisfy the exclusion restriction on our endogenous variable of interest (education).
Our estimation is more robust in addressing the endogeneity of education (years of schooling
at household level). Both instruments suggest that districts with higher number of schools and
higher level of enrollment tend to have households with higher level of education.
Esteban and Ray (1999) observed that unequal distribution of wealth - especially in de-
veloping countries - facilitates bribery and corruption of politicians and triggers intense rent-
seeking. Khamis et al. (2012) related consumption inequality to the concept of status signalling
and observed large and significant difference across groups with distinctive social identities.
They describe that differences in the consumption pattern across groups are mostly linked to
preferences and norms of society. In this context, considering consumption differences, our re-
sults remain consistent with the literature while supporting the broad theoretical conclusions of
Cont and Lowe (2010) that multiple equilibria could result from conflicts between various social
groups.
If social identity is the only reason that governs individual consumption pattern, then
what would have happened to average consumption differences between groups if one exchanges
their characteristics namely educational and demographic factors. In this regard, we used the
counterfactual regression analysis and observed that even if we exchange their characteristics,
the counterfactual deprived groups (marginalized groups in the case of caste, and non-Hindus
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in the case of religion) are still not able to consume as much as their counterparts (although
slightly higher than their own consumption), and therefore one’s social identity does matter in
explaining where a household is in the consumption distribution.
Widening income/consumption gap between groups in our study suggests the reasons for
social conflict between groups over opportunities or availability of public goods and thus strongly
links to the concept of polarization16. Besides, such inequality leads to group conflict, where
poor individuals are feeling strong antagonism against the rich in the same group, providing
potential reasons for social discrimination and possible conflict. Overall, the widening gaps
could indirectly imply policy ineffectiveness, which requires further investigation. Since, social
cohesion (alienation) is a multi-dimensional concept, it requires a direct measure or non-economic
dimensions such as trust, civic cooperation and confidence in law, to understand its complete
effect in a given society. We did not incorporate these non-monetary dimensions because of data
limitations.
 Policy relevance
Our results from the policy perspective point out that the rise in consumption gap between
groups weakens the mechanism of social cohesion, which in turn could affect the current path
of economic development. If the goal of public policy is to make economic growth inclusive,
then the promotion of social cohesion through the strengthening of social networks, trust and
tolerance, and motivating people to show solidarity to obey social rules and to engage them
with different channels of economic development, are promising roads to inclusive development.
We stress that our results on the effect of education in minimizing distance are only suggestive
of policy actions, particularly in the areas of fiscal, employment and social policies to improve
access to opportunities for marginalised sections of the society that can help reduce the growing
consumption distance identified in this paper.
An implication of our results suggests that the adopted reservation policies for marginalized
groups are probably effective to some extent in low consumption groups, whereas in privileged
groups, some other factors are contributing towards the higher persistence of consumption gap.
The lower gap between privileged and marginalized groups at the bottom-end of the distribu-
tion, thus, gives a clear indication of the success of reservation policies in protecting marginalized
groups from discriminatory practices in various public sector organisations. Besides, as shown
in this paper, education expansion for the marginalised group should be promoted by the gov-
ernment which can be alienation-reducing.
References
[1] Akerlof, G.A. (1997), Social Distance and Social Decisions, Econometrica, 65(5), 1005-27.
[2] Ambedkar, B. R. (1944), Annihilation of Caste with a Reply to Mahatma Gandhi, (3rd
edition).
16Polarization here only refers to the alienation that individuals and groups feel from one another as opposed
to what is described in Duclos et al. (2004).
27
[3] Andrews, D. and Leigh, A. (2009), More inequality, less social mobility, Applied Economics
Letters, 16 (15), pp. 1489-92.
[4] Bandyopadhyay, S. (2012), Convergence Clubs in Incomes across Indian States: Is There
Evidence of a Neighbours’ Effect? Economics Letters, 116, 565 -70.
[5] Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E. (2007) The economic lives of the poor. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 21, no. 1, 141- 67.
[6] Basu, S. and Mallick, S. (2008) When does growth trickle down to the poor? The Indian
case. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 32 no. 3, 461 - 77.
[7] Bogardus, Emory S. (1933), A Social Distance Scale, Sociology and Social Research,
17:26571.
[8] Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2005), An IV model of quantile treatment effects,
Econometrica (73), 245-61.
[9] Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2008), Instrumental variable quantile regression: A
robust inference approach, Journal of Econometrics (142), 379-98.
[10] Cont, R. and M. Lowe (2010), Social distance, heterogeneity and social interactions, Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 46: 572-90.
[11] Dalton, P. S., Ghosal, S. and Mani, A. (2016), Poverty and Aspirations Failure. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 126: 165-88.
[12] Corak, M. (2013), Income inequality, equality of opportunity, and intergenerational mobil-
ity, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 79 -102
[13] Deaton, A. (1997), Poverty Among Children and the Elderly in Developing Countries,
Research Program in Development Studies (Unpublished manuscript).
[14] Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1980), An Almost Ideal Demand System, American Eco-
nomic Review 70(3), 312-26.
[15] Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1986), On Measuring Child Costs: With Applications to
Poor Countries, Journal of Political Economy 94: 720- 44.
[16] Dev, S.M. (2013), India development report, Oxford University Press, New Delhi (2013)
[17] Duclos, J-Y, J. Esteban, and D. Ray (2004), Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Esti-
mation, Econometrica 72, 1737-72.
[18] Dutta, I., Madden, P. and Mishra, A. (2014), Group inequality and conflict, The Manchester
School, 82 (3), 257-83.
[19] Esteban, J. and D. Ray (1999), Conflict and Distribution, Journal of Economic Theory 87,
379 - 415.
28
[20] Esteban, J. and D. Ray (2011), A Model of Ethnic Conflict, Journal of the European
Economic Association 9, 496 - 521.
[21] Esteban, J., Mayoral, L., Ray, D. (2012), Ethnicity and Conflict: An Empirical Study,
American Economic Review, 102(4): 1310 - 42.
[22] Genicot, G and Ray, D. (2006), Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart, Journal
of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 71-100
[23] Gradstein, M. and M. Justman (2002), Education, Social Cohesion, and Economic Growth,
American Economic Review, 92(4): 1192 -1204.
[24] Jayadev, A., and S.G. Reddy (2011) Inequalities between Groups: Theory and Empirics,
World Development, 39 (2): 159-173.
[25] Khamis, M., N. Prakash, and Z. Siddique (2012), Consumption and social identity: Evi-
dence from India, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83 (3): 353 - 371.
[26] Kijima, Y. (2006), Why did wage inequality increase? Evidence from urban India 1983-99,
Journal of Development Economics, 81(1): 97 - 117.
[27] Koenker, R. and Bassett, G. (1978), Regression Quantiles, Econometrica, 46 (1): 33 - 50.
[28] Kumar, T.K., Mallick, S.K. and Holla, J. (2009) Estimating consumption deprivation in
India using survey data: a state-level ruralurban analysis before and during the reform
period. Journal of Development Studies, 45 (4): 441 - 470.
[29] Lahiri, A., V. Hnatkovska, and S.B. Paul (2012), Castes and Labor Mobility, American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4(2).
[30] Machado, J. and J. Mata (2005), Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distri-
butions using quantile regression, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20:4, pp. 445 - 465.
[31] Mallick, S. K. (2014), Disentangling the Poverty Effects of Sectoral Output, Prices, and
Policies in India. Review of Income and Wealth, 60: 773 - 801.
[32] Mitra, A. and D. Ray (2014), Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-
Muslim Violence in India, Journal of Political Economy 122, 719 -765.
[33] Munshi, K. and M. Rosenzweig (2006), Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World:
Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy, American Economic Re-
view, 96(4), 1225 -1252.
[34] Motiram, S., and Sarma, N. (2014), Polarization, inequality, and growth: The Indian ex-
perience. Oxford Development Studies, 42(3), 297 - 318.
[35] N˜opo (2008), Matching as a Tool to Decompose Wage Gaps, The Review of Economics and
Statistics, MIT Press, 90(2), 290 -299.
29
[36] Rosenzweig, M. R. and Zhang, J. (2006), Do Population Control Policies Induce More
Human Capital Investment? Twins, Birthweight, and China’s ’One Child’ Policy, IZA
Discussion Papers 2082, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[37] Srinivas, M. N. (1956), A note on sanskritization and westernization, The Far Eastern
Quarterly, 15 (4), pp. 481- 496
[38] Varshney A. (2001), Ethinc Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond, World Politics,
53 (3): 362 - 98.
30
Appendix A
 Steps involved in constructing consumption distance
A detailed description of the consumption data is provided below along with the data
normalization strategies in operationalising the idea of social distance in terms of consumption
distance. We have taken individual consumption deviation from a reference point such as the
mean of the consumption expenditure (C¯) from their own group, and then divided by their group
standard deviation (σ). For example, Hindus individual consumption distance is calculated in
the following way:
Step 1: First consider State = i (i=1, 2, . . . n) in the period t = 1993 (t=1993, 2004, and
2011).
Step 2: Identify Hindu individuals in State 1.
Step 3: Calculate individual deviation from the mean and divide by their standard devi-
ation.
Step 4: Since both rural & urban have different consumption levels, the deviation for all
urban Hindus in State 1 is calculated first and then deviation for rural Hindus is calculated next
and then across two different social groups based on caste. A similar exercise is performed for
non-Hindus in the same state.
Step 5: Repeat Steps 1 to step 4 for all other states and for the given time periods.
In addition to this and for robustness purpose, we have tested our baseline results (see
Table 7) for the following model specifications:
1. Using all the above 5 steps, individual deviations are calculated from mean of the con-
sumption level after considering the equal adult-level division of consumption in the same
household (i.e., equivalence method). To check this assumption, we have taken the square
root scale, as an equivalence scale, and then the regression is performed across the distri-
bution (see Table 7).
2. Using all the above 5 steps, we also evaluate what happens if we keep median as a reference
point instead of mean but keep the spread or dispersion bound same. In other words, what
happens if one fixes the (σ) as a bound? (see Table 7 )
3. Using all the above 5 steps, we further evaluate individual consumption deviation being
calculated from the median and then consider what happens if one changes the dispersion
bound from (σ) to max-min? (see Table 7)
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 Instrumental variable quantile regression approach
Let us assume that we are interested in the scalar potential outcome YD (in our case,
variability in consumption distance) conditional on a vector of variables, X = x. Also assume
that we have a vector of binary indicators of treatment status, denoted as D. Also describe by
q(.) the conditional τ -quantile function. Then conditional on X = x, the outcome YD can be
presented by the following quantile function:
Y(D,x) = q(D,x, UD) where U |x, z ∼ u(0, 1) (3)
In the above, U is a non-separable error and z is a vector of excluded instruments correlated
with endogenous variable, D, but not correlated with the outcome variable (Y ). We can describe
D as:
D = δ(X,Z, V )
where z is a vector of excluded instruments and correlated with endogenous variable (d) but
not correlated with the outcome variable (Y ). Also note that V is a vector unobservable char-
acteristics and can depend on u. A further note D = δ(X,Z, V ) is in order. Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2005) notes that conditioning on the instrument as in D(.) may appear to be a natu-
ral strategy for estimating quantile treatment effect. In general, variation of treatment effects
across households creates many problems for ’conditioning on Z’ approaches. This problem is
resolved in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) by imposing rank similarity conditions and quan-
tile transforms. For the sake of convenience, we assume a linear model for the IVQR estimator
q(D,x, UD), where we describe:
q(d, x, θ) = d′α(θ) + x′β(θ) (4)
with q(.) being assumed to be a strictly increasing in θ. Our interest is in obtaining the treat-
ment effects defined by q(d, x, θ) − q(d0, x, θ) holding unobserved heterogeneity UD fixed at θ.
The presence of instrumental variables in this scenario leads to a set of moment conditions
(identification equation) described as:
P [Y ≤ q(d, x, θ)|z, x] = θ (5)
which allows us to estimate α(θ) and β(θ). Under the assumption of ranking invariance and
linearity, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2008) derive the objective function as:
argminE(ρθ[y − d′α(θ)− x′β(θ)− z′γ(θ)]) (6)
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 Counterfactual decomposition approach
To understand the concept of the counterfactual approach, consider two groups, A (Privi-
leged/Hindu) and B (Marginalized/non-Hindus), those who are inherited with different types of
characteristics and thus consume differently. Their consumption (outcome) variable C is linearly
related to the covariates, X, and the error term  is conditionally independent of X and can be
written in the following way:
CA = XAβA + A (7)
CB = XBβB + B (8)
where X is a set of standard control variables such as age, household size, education level,
household type and state. The consumption gap between two groups can be calculated as
CA − CB = XAβA −XBβB (9)
Since both groups are endowed with certain distinct characteristics and thus one can ask
what would group B consume if they were endowed with the same characteristics like their
counterpartgroup A. This can be calculated as
C∗ = XAβB (10)
In terms of counterfactual equation, the equation 9 thus can be written as
CA − CB = XAβA − C∗ + C∗ −XBβB
= XAβA −XAβB +XAβB −XBβB
= XA(βA − βB) + βB(XA −XB)
The quatile counterfactual decomposition assumption is that the regression quantiles are
βA(u) for group A and βB(u) for group B for each u[0, 1] ; i.e., Qu(CA|XA = xA = xAβA(u)
u[0, 1] and similarly for group B. The distribution of CA conditional on XA = xA is completely
characterized by the collection of regression quantiles [βA(u);u[0, 1], and likewise for the dis-
tribution of CB conditional onXB = xB. The counterfactual method generates a sample from
the unconditional distribution of CAB as follows:
1. Sample u from a standard distribution .
2. Compute this βˆB(U), i.e., estimate the u
th regression quantile of distribution CB on xB.
3. Sample xA from the empirical distribution GˆXA .
4. Compute CˆAB = xAβˆ
B(u). Repeat steps 1 to 3 M times.
The underlying methodological approach is as follows:
Qτ (CˆA|βˆA − CˆB|βˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gap
= [Qτ (CˆA|βˆA)−Qτ (CˆA|βˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficient
] + [Qτ (CˆA|βˆB)−Qτ (CˆB|βˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics
] +  (11)
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 Matching approach N˜opo (2008)
The potential problem in any decomposition approach is misspecification due to differences in
support of the empirical distribution of individual characteristics between two groups (in our case
this is between two social identities: i.e., between privileged and marginalized groups/Hindus
and non-Hindus). To overcome this problem, we use N˜opo (2008) matching algorithm to solve
the problem of specification bias. The step-by-step procedure of this matching algorithm17 is
explained next:
 Step 1: Select one marginalized individual from the sample (without replacement).
 Step 2: Select all the privileged individuals that have the same characteristics as the
marginalized individual previously selected.
 Step 3: With all the individuals selected in step 2, construct a synthetic individual whose
consumption is the average of all of them and match the individual to the original marginal-
ized group.
 Step 4: Put the observations of both individuals (the synthetic privileged and marginalized
groups) in their respective new samples of matched individuals.
 Repeat steps 1 through 4 until we exhaust the original marginalized individuals sample.
The new data set contains the observations of matched privileged and marginalized individuals
based on the same empirical distribution of probabilities for characteristics. The advantage of
such matching approach is the modelling assumption that the same individuals with the same
observable characteristics should consume the same, regardless of their social status.
17For details on econometric specification, see N˜opo (2008)
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Appendix B
Figure 8: Relationship between Caste (A & B) and Religion (C& D) with level of development
A B
C D
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Figure 9: The effect of marginalized group relative to privileged group on consumption distance
across the distribution
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Figure 10: The effect of non-Hindus relative to Hindus on consumption distance across the
distribution
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Figure 11: Effect of education on consumption level across the distribution in 1993
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(i)The black line is estimated coefficient, whereas the shaded gray lines are confidence interval at 95%level and at
different quantiles. (ii) Thick dashed black line is OLS and both dashed lines are confidence interval at the mean
in each figure.
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